The just released report on the tragic fire at London’s Grenfell Tower makes harrowing reading. The sheer mendacity of all concerned in the process that led to 72 lives lost is appalling. A question that arises in Australia, as it did immediately after the fire, is could it happen here?
Now we have the report, we know the answer is a definite no. The reasons are as much good luck as good planning. But that deduction will be disputed by those on a mission to change our building industry, who will say that we are in danger. We are not, and here is the evidence to that contrary view.
The Grenfell flat’s upgrade, undertaken seven years ago, was to primarily to improve both the thermal comfort and health of residents in the tower. In London’s cold and rainy winters the high internal humidity from cooking, washing, even breathing, condenses on the inside of the thin external panels and single glazing of the 1974 building. This leads to mould on the walls and respiratory diseases for the residents.
Adding a layer of insulation and protective cladding on the outside of the building raises the internal temperature and greatly reduces the condensation. This ‘outsulation skin’, also improves the aesthetics, but the real driver was the admirable intention to improve the lives of the social housing tenants.
The same problems of condensation occur in the contemporaneous early seventies precast concrete panel tower blocks built by Housing Commissions in Sydney and Melbourne, although to a lesser extent given our milder climates. The drive in Britain to improve wall insulation has a similar foundation to our program for better roof insulation in detached homes, which led to the ‘Pink Batts’ debacle.
The report lays blame at every step of the process: inexperienced architects, poor consultants, poor design choices, greedy suppliers, illegal certification, swapping out products, incorrect installations. All driven by cost. The result was a highly flammable exterior that erupted like a ‘Roman Candle’.
Some of the same materials and techniques have been used in Australia, but several factors have prevented a similar fate.
Firstly, and fortuitously, our climate is seen as so benign that the regulations haven’t required wall insulation in our buildings until very recently, and even then, there is no incentive or regulation to retrofit insulation to older buildings to improve the thermal performance. A ‘lucky country’ climate outcome.
Secondly, as a suburban nation we have fewer old high-rise apartment towers than Britain. Ours are mostly low rise, built in brick and concrete. Ugly but effective. Thirdly, our new mid-rise towers are clad in lightweight concrete, or with fully glazed walls and internal insulation.
Some of the same cladding as Grenfell has been used in a few of our apartment buildings: aluminium composite panels, with a polyethylene core, and dodgy certification. But the insulation goes missing given the milder climates. There have been a few fires too, thankfully resulting in no loss of life. Stringent requirements were introduced six years ago, and the defective cladding is slowly being replaced.
But the most dramatic difference between the Grenfell tower and those in Australia, is in the design for fire safety in the original buildings.
Since the late sixties, all apartment buildings over eight storeys in Australia require a sprinkler system, and two completely separate fire stairs, both of which must be pressurised –a mechanical system to pump fresh air into the fire stair to prevent smoke from entering (the big killer). Yearly inspections of the key components – sprinklers, fire rated doors, smoke systems - must be carried out.
Grenfell was 24 storeys, with a single fire stair in a central core, no stair pressurisation and no sprinklers. Residents claimed there was poor maintenance of the apartments’ fire doors, smoke detectors and inadequate fire extinguishers.
Despite these poor fire safety designs, or perhaps because of them, Grenfell had a ‘stay in place requirement’, to remain inside the apartment in a fire emergency. By contrast, our more stringent regulations require residents to evacuate using the fire stairs whenever a fire alarm rings.
These failings contributed to the catastrophic outcome at Grenfell, yet they are hardly addressed in the inquiry report. Perhaps it is one thing to highlight the inadequacies of re-cladding systems, another to condemn whole generations of British apartment buildings as fire risks.
Thanks to luck, and better regulations, we will not see a Grenfell Tower tragedy in our cities.
This is the first design-i, a new series on design ideas on Wednesdays, that replaces the old Tone on Tuesday, The(A&D newsletter no longer coming out on Tuesday it was time has come to retire the title). Nevertheless, all those old columns can be found here and you can still contact TW at [email protected].
design-i #1, 16 Oct 2024. Researched and written by Tone Wheeler, architect / Adjunct Prof UNSW / President AAA. The views expressed are his
